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Individualization Claims in Forensic
Science: Still Unwarranted
Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks†
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a 2008 paper published in the Vanderbilt Law Review
entitled The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science
Evidence,1 we argued that no scientific basis exists for the
proposition that forensic scientists can “individualize” an
unknown marking (such as a fingerprint, tire track, or
handwriting sample) to a particular person or object to the
exclusion of all others in the world.
In that article we made the following claims:
(1) the data necessary to achieve individualization have never been
collected for any of the forensic science fields which aspire to
individualize the source of crime scene evidence to its sole possible
contributor;
(2) the best available—and perhaps the only scientifically
defensible—approach to forensic identification is the use of random
match probability estimates (which are not yet employed by any of
the traditional forensic identification sciences);
(3) the argument that all objects are discernibly unique stands on
little more than an oft-repeated maxim of forensic science legend and
the illusory intuition that small frequencies imply uniqueness;
(4) probability estimates (by definition) cannot lead to uniqueness or
individualization;
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Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in
Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008) [hereinafter Fallacy].
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(5) assertions of individualization generally exaggerate what is
known or can be accomplished by forensic examiners.2

The central point and purpose of our article was a
practical concern: to argue that because no field of forensic
identification
has
adequate
grounds
for
making
individualization claims, expert witnesses from those fields
should not make such claims in their reports and testimony.
We recommended that, in the short term, expert witnesses
should (a) revise their testimonial language to more accurately
characterize the meaning and value of their findings, and (b)
report only those inferences that can be supported by what is
actually known by their fields.3 We further suggested that, in
the long term, empirical research should be undertaken to
place the forensic disciplines on more solid scientific footing.4
In this issue of the Brooklyn Law Review, we clarify,
refine, and extend some of the ideas presented in Fallacy. Some
of the refinements are prompted by Professor David Kaye’s
paper, also in this issue of the Review,5 in which he takes issue
with some of the arguments we made in Fallacy.
2

Moreover, we acknowledged that none of these essential insights is original
to us. Others have discussed these problems for decades. We merely pulled these ideas
together and discussed their implications.
3
Others have also called attention to the difficulty or impossibility of
justifying claims of individualization. See Fallacy, supra note 1, at 214-16. Some
thoughtful forensic scientists, such as Christophe Champod and his colleagues, have
responded by attempting to develop probabilistic characterizations of fingerprint
comparisons. See Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to
Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101 (2001); Cedric Neumann et
al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of
Any Number of Minutiae, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 54 (2007). Others have begun to tame the
language used when reporting the meaning of a match. See, e.g., Firearms and
Toolmark Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY, § 34:1 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2008-2009).
4
Cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009) [hereinafter
NRC Report] (recognizing that none of the techniques that were the focus of our article
have “been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific
individual or source”); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation of
Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 87, 88 (2008)
(arguing that the validity of the ACE-V fingerprint methodology has not been
established through rigorous scientific experiments); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity
of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 134 (2008) (“[T]he undeniable reality is that the community
of forensic science professionals has not done nearly as much as it reasonably could
have done to establish either the validity of its approach or the accuracy of its
practitioners’ conclusions.”).
5
David H. Kaye, Probability, Individualization and Uniqueness in Forensic
Science Evidence: Listening to the Academies, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1163 (2010).
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At the same time, we think it is important to point out
that Professor Kaye appears to agree with our key points. For
example, Professor Kaye does not believe that uniqueness has
been established in any of the traditional, low-tech forensic
sciences such as handwriting, toolmark identification,
shoeprints, or fingerprints.6 He does not believe that mere
matching, without a showing of uniqueness, can establish
individualization in the typical case.7 He does not argue that
testimony asserting that an object has been linked to its source
to the exclusion of all others in the world is a scientifically
reliable statement in any traditional forensic science discipline
given the current state of knowledge.8 He does not dispute our
claim that probabilistic statements rather than absolutist
statements would provide a more accurate characterization of
forensic identification.9 He agrees that there is a disconnect
between the strong claims made by forensic scientists and the
available scientific data.10 And he agrees that reform is in
order.11
If we agree on so much,12 what is the disagreement? The
overarching difference is that while our focus leans toward the
practical implications for courts of the large problems (on
which we agree), Professor Kaye’s focus is on more abstract and
conceptual issues—worthy of serious discussion, but with fewer
implications for forensic science or judicial practice. Among
6

See generally id.
Although the heading of Section II in Professor Kaye’s article reads
“Individualization Without Uniqueness,” it appears that he does not believe that
individualization can be achieved in the typical case without uniqueness. Elsewhere he
has written: “A true match establishes that the two samples of DNA have the same
profile. Unless the profile is unique, however, a true match does not conclusively prove
that the two samples came from the same source.” DNA Typing, in 4 MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 30:1 (emphasis added) (App. 30B, defining “True
Match”).
8
“[U]nder normal relevance rules, existing theory and data on the
discernible uniqueness of trace evidence typically are too weak to justify admission of
an opinion that a pattern is unique.” Kaye, supra note 5, at 1182-83.
9
Some leading forensic scientists agree and have discussed this issue in
detail. See Champod & Evett, supra note 3.
10
“[I]t is clear that if forensic scientists are to contribute fully to the just
resolution of criminal cases, they need a less absolutist and more nuanced theory of
identification than the traditional presumption of characteristics that are intuitively
judged to be individualizing.” Kaye, supra note 5, at 1185-86.
11
Id. at 1165 (“With the imprimatur of the National Academy of Sciences
behind recommendations for major change, the need for forensic scientists or analysts
to retreat from the most extreme claims finally should be apparent to the judiciary as
well as the forensic science community.”).
12
“I agree with the critique of a great deal of forensic science testimony . . . .”
Id. at 1166.
7
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these are: definitions (when can something properly be termed
“metaphysical”?), logic and linguistics (when may probabilistic
knowledge be expressed as an absolute? what are the customs
of scientific communities for taking such linguistic shortcuts?),
locating exceptions to general rules (are there current
situations where an individualization claim is justifiable?), and
thoughts about when an inferential leap might be small enough
to be justified.13
13

Another possible difference of note is that many of Kaye’s illustrations and
arguments are based on DNA or other normal sciences. However, Fallacy was
concerned almost exclusively with non-DNA forensic identification: handwriting, tire
impressions, shoe prints, fingerprints, toolmarks, firearms, etc. DNA databases and
methods are not illustrative of how other forensic identification sciences operate. See
NRC Report, supra note 4, at 7 (“With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however,
no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and
with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a
specific individual or source.”).
Unlike most traditional forensic sciences, DNA typing stands out as an
area that has, from its beginnings, respected the underlying probabilistic nature of
forensic identification. Consider the following from a memo in which a crime laboratory
informed the prosecutors with whom it works that it will cease using potentially
misleading terminology and will limit its characterizations of the meaning of
indistinguishably similar DNA samples to the associated random match probabilities:
The purpose of a forensic DNA analysis is to determine whether an
individual can be excluded as the donor of a body fluid stain or other bodily
substance, the source of which is in question. Once a comparison has been
made between the DNA profile results from the questioned source and the
DNA profile results from the reference person, one of two conclusions may be
drawn:


the reference person is excluded as the donor of the questioned sample, or

 the reference person cannot be excluded as the donor of the questioned
sample
This memo is to advise you that, effective November 1, 2003, the term
‘match’ will no longer be used in the conclusions of CFS DNA reports, in an
effort to more clearly link the conclusion drawn from an analysis to its
purpose. For example, when a DNA profile from person ‘A’ matches a DNA
profile from the crime scene, the conclusion in the CFS report will state that
“person ‘A’ cannot be excluded as the contributor of the crime scene profile.”
The significance of DNA findings will continue to be defined using a
statistical calculation which addresses the probability of coincidentally
selecting someone from the general population who also would not be
excluded as the source of a DNA profile.
....
The reported probability is the sole indicator of the significance of the finding
that a person cannot be excluded as the source of a DNA profile.
Memorandum from R.J. Prime, Director of The Centre of Forensic Sciences for the
province of Ontario to Crown attorneys for the province (October 24, 2003).
Unfortunately, the U.S. FBI does not follow this policy. Constance Holden, DNA
Fingerprinting Comes of Age, 278 SCI. 1407, 1407 (1997) (reporting that the FBI
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Before responding to some of the issues that Professor
Kaye raises, we offer a more specific definition of the
“individualization fallacy” that we introduced in Fallacy. We
also briefly compare and contrast this fallacy with others that
appear in the literature.
II.

DEFINING THE INDIVIDUALIZATION FALLACY

In Fallacy we did not offer a precise definition of the
individualization fallacy.14 We try to remedy that here. The
individualization fallacy refers to the belief that a particular
known person or object must be the source of questioned
markings whenever (a) the examiner judges that a sufficient
number of characteristics are observable in both the questioned
markings and the known, and (b) the examiner cannot
otherwise distinguish the questioned markings from the
known. In other words, the fallacy arises when the forensic
scientist rules out all other possible sources for the unknown
marking, including the multitude he has not examined, once he
has found a single object or person that matches the features of
the unknown marking. The fallacy is deeply entrenched in
forensic science practice, where most examiners say that their
knowledge, training, and experience enable them to make the
inferential leap from observed consistencies between markings
and their putative source to a conclusion that no other object in
the world could have produced those markings.15
Several subtleties and distinctions are worth noting
concerning the notion of uniqueness and fallacies that are
related to the individualization fallacy.
A.

Uniqueness

A belief that one can individualize or has individualized
is often bolstered by the claim that no two objects in the
encourages examiners to testify that two samples are a perfect match in cases where
the random match probability is less than one in 260 billion).
14
Simon Cole, Against Uniqueness, Against Individualization, and how
Wittgenstein Can Save Forensic Identification, LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK (forthcoming).
15
The International Association for Identification, which is one of the oldest
and largest organizations of forensic science professionals, expects its members to offer
fingerprint individualizations whenever matches are found. INT’L ASSOC.
IDENTIFICATION, IAI POSITION CONCERNING LATENT FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION 1
(2007), http://www.theiai.org/current_affairs/fingerprint_position_paper_20071129.pdf
(“The IAI endorses the position that individuals may be identified as the source of a
particular friction skin impression . . . .”).
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universe leave indistinguishably similar markings. This claim
of uniqueness (first expressed in the maxim that “nature never
repeats”) is often proffered by forensic science practitioners,
forensic science authorities, courts, and even federal agencies
as “a defensible epistemological foundation for forensic
testimonial claims of source attribution.”16 Assuming
uniqueness to be true shortens the inferential chain from the
perception that two markings are indistinguishably alike to the
claim that whatever made one set of markings must have made
the other.17
But uniqueness is not essential to the practice of
forensic individualization.18 Some examiners assert that they
need deal only with the samples in front of them—the
questioned and the known—and need give no thought at all to
the frequency with which particular characteristics or sets of
characteristics exist within the population from which those
mark-producing objects came. Others claim to be able to
discern
“individualizing”
characteristics
from
nonindividualizing markings, again without concerning themselves
with population distributions of mark-producing objects. To be
sure, there are certain circumstances where individualization
could be achieved without having to make reference to the full
population of such objects.19 But such circumstances are
exceptional and do not explain why practitioners in virtually
all areas of forensic identification—with the notable exception
of DNA typing—behave as if the population of potential sources
is of no consequence to the task of individualizing.20

16

Cole, supra note 14, at 12.
Compare the reasoning of examiners of fingerprints, firearms,
handwriting, etc., to that of DNA examiners. The former go directly from the
perception of great similarity to a conclusion of individualization. The latter must
pause to calculate random match probabilities based on population data.
18
Cole, supra note 14, at 26 (“What distinguishes areas of friction ridge skin
from these other objects is not ‘uniqueness’; it is their diagnosticity: our ability to
assign traces of these objects to their correct source with a certain degree of specificity
under certain parameters of detection and under certain rules governing such
assignments.”).
19
See Kaye, supra note 5, at 1173-77.
20
This disregard of populations might be the result of the underlying
assumption of uniqueness being so fully incorporated into forensic individualization
practice that examiners have forgotten, or set aside, the argued basis for ignoring
populations.
17
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The Uniqueness Fallacy

In Fallacy, we mentioned that the individualization
fallacy is a cousin of David Balding’s uniqueness fallacy.21 The
uniqueness fallacy is the mistaken belief that whenever the
expected number of people or objects sharing a set of known
characteristics is less than one, then one may infer that the
known person or object is unique.22 Some proponents of
individualization have made, and many courts have accepted,
the argument that if the population is smaller than the inverse
of the random match probability, then uniqueness is
established.23 For example, if there are 6 billion people on earth,
and an analyst reports that the relevant random match
probability for, say, a DNA profile is 1 in 20 billion, then it is
fallacious to conclude that the DNA profile in question must be
unique. Fallacy cites Balding to explain why this is a fallacy,
and presents other illustrative explanations.
C.

The Fingerprint Examiner’s Fallacy

According to Simon Cole, the fingerprint examiner’s
fallacy occurs when the (assumed) uniqueness of fingerprints is
invoked to support the asserted accuracy with which
fingerprint examiners can identify the source of latent prints.24
As Cole points out, the relationship between fingerprint
uniqueness and examiner accuracy is a tenuous one.25 Even if
fingerprints are unique, it is fallacious to assume that
uniqueness somehow confirms the accuracy of examiners’
identifications. By analogy, the (assumed) fact that every
21

Fallacy, supra note 1, at 205; see DAVID J. BALDING, WEIGHT-OFEVIDENCE: DNA PROFILES 148 (2005).
22
Fallacy, supra note 1, at 203.
23
Id. at 203-05.
24
Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility
Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1198
(2004) (defining this fallacy: “The fingerprint examiner’s fallacy consists of reasoning
that the uniqueness of the object of forensic study vouches for the validity of a forensic
matching process.”). In the course of explicating the “fingerprint examiner’s fallacy,”
Cole summarizes other elements that we develop in Fallacy and which others have
raised for a long time. Indeed, Cole’s historical work shows that the problems
associated with making justifiable individualization claims have been appreciated by
forensic scientists and scholars for at least a century. Id. at 1199 (citing HENRY
FAULDS, GUIDE TO FINGER-PRINT IDENTIFICATION 51 (1905)). However, this awareness
has largely been hidden from the courts, which may help explain why the NRC Report,
supra note 4, at 53, concludes that “the courts have been utterly ineffective” in filtering
forensic identification evidence.
25
Cole, supra note 24, at 1198.
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human face is distinguishable from every other human face
does not assure that eyewitness identifications are always
accurate. Cole argues that much more is involved in drawing
conclusions and in evaluating the risk of error, and that claims
of uniqueness do not get us very far in those regards.26
In sum, several related forensic science fallacies have
been identified, but they are distinct. The uniqueness fallacy
concerns the faulty reasoning that match probabilities smaller
than the reciprocal of the population of interest lead to
inferences of uniqueness. The fingerprint examiner’s fallacy
concerns the faulty reasoning that turns the alleged
uniqueness of fingerprints into an argument for the accuracy of
fingerprint identifications. The individualization fallacy, which
was suggested in Fallacy, concerns the faulty reasoning that
certain observations are sufficient to individualize, regardless
of whether uniqueness is invoked in support.
III.

RESPONDING TO PROFESSOR KAYE

Professor Kaye takes issue with what he refers to as our
“radical skepticism of uniqueness,”27 though, as mentioned in
the Introduction, he agrees with the gravamen of Fallacy.28 The
disagreements that Professor Kaye has with Fallacy have more
to do with theoretical issues about what might be possible in
forensic science than with practical concerns about what has
been achieved and how those achievements are reflected in
courtroom practice. Three topics on which we do appear to
disagree are metaphysics, uniqueness, and individualization.
A.

Metaphysics

Professor Kaye questions our suggestion that forensic
individualization rests more on metaphysical and rhetorical
grounds than on scientific and empirical grounds. As we
understand his argument, Professor Kaye’s position is that the
individualization hypothesis is not metaphysical because
“individuality . . . [concerns] measurable characteristics that
26

Id. at 1201-03.
We doubt that our position on uniqueness qualifies as “radical skepticism.” Our
position is that it has not been proved and that it seems unlikely that so extreme a position
as individualization-to-the-exclusion-of-all-others—a frequently-invoked foundation stone of
forensic individualization—could be proved. Kaye, supra note 5, at 1166.
28
“Although I agree with the critique of a great deal of forensic science
testimony . . . .” Id.
27
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can exhibit unequivocal differences and similarities.”29
Although we largely agree with the quoted statement,30 it
reflects only part of the picture. The larger and more pragmatic
part is that individualization claims come to court supported
mainly by exaggerated rhetoric and reasoning that is grounded
in little empirical data.31 Professor Kaye agrees that the
rhetoric of forensic individualization far exceeds the science,32
though he takes issue with our use of the word “metaphysical”
to describe the foundations for the individualization claim.33 We
maintain that our use of the term in this context is accurate
and appropriate.
In a concluding section in Fallacy titled “Unproved and
Perhaps Unprovable,” we wrote:
In sum, no sound and rigorous evidence supports the assumption of
unique individualization. Moreover, the assumption is so heroic and
the research required to test it seriously would be so massive that
one must doubt whether it is possible to conduct an empirical study
or set of studies that would provide solid support for the hypothesis.34

Our claim, then, is not that there is a rule of logic or
ontology that prevents individualization. Instead, we are
concerned with the more practical issues of whether
individualization has been proven, how amenable it is to
testing, and whether the self-presentation of these fields in
court accurately reflects the limitations of testing, proof, and
case-specific conclusions. On all of these issues, we think
forensic individualization science has fallen short despite being
in the expert witness business for a century. Consequently, we
think it is fair to characterize the individualization claim as
predominantly rhetorical. As for our invocation of
29

Id. at 1167.
“Unequivocal” is too strong. Perceptual and judgmental disagreements will
be common in the process of making such assessments. See, e.g., I.W. Evett & R.L.
Williams, A Review of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in England and Wales,
46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 49 (1996).
31
NRC Report, supra note 4, at 188-89 (“In most forensic science disciplines,
no studies have been conducted of large populations to establish the uniqueness of
marks or features”); id. at 184 (“[T]he concept of ‘uniquely associated with’ must be
replaced with a probabilistic association . . . .”); see also Harry T. Edwards, Solving the
Problems That Plague the Forensic Science Community, 50 JURIMETRICS 5, 8-9 (2009)
(referring to the “dearth of scientific research to establish limits of performance, to
ascertain quantifiable measures of uncertainty, and to address the impact of the
sources of variability and potential bias in fingerprint examinations and in other
forensic disciplines that rely on subjective assessments of matching characteristics”).
32
See supra notes 8, 10-12 and accompanying text.
33
Kaye, supra note 5, at 1167.
34
Fallacy, supra note 1, at 213-14.
30
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“metaphysical,” readers who consult a good dictionary are
likely to find that there are several meanings of this word that
fit well with the situation we have described.
B.

Uniqueness

Professor Kaye seems to agree with our central point
about uniqueness. That is, he seems to agree that data—either
in principle or in practice—cannot establish the truth of a
uniqueness point prediction.35 He says: “Uniqueness means that
the proportion of objects with the given feature in the whole
population of size N is exactly 1/N. Yet, no matter how close the
sample proportion comes to 1/N, the next sample datum could
establish that the population proportion is 2/N or more.”36
However, Professor Kaye does not think that the fact that
empirical sampling has not and cannot demonstrate
uniqueness is the important point.37 Instead, he believes that
35

Professor Kaye objects to this characterization of his position. That is,
whereas we say that he agrees with us that data cannot establish the truth of a
uniqueness point prediction, he says that his position is that “data cannot establish to
an absolute certainty the truth of any point estimate of any population parameter.”
Email from David Kaye to Jay Koehler & Michael Saks (Feb. 21, 2010, 15:16) (on file
with authors) (emphasis added). In this same correspondence, Professor Kaye also says
that he believes that “one can ‘establish the truth’ of a proposition without being 100%
certain that it is true.” Id. Apparently, then, our disagreement turns on what it means
to “establish the truth” of a proposition. When we say “establish the truth” of a
particular point prediction, we mean that all point predictions other than the target
prediction have been ruled out by the data. We interpret Professor Kaye’s use of the
phrase “establish the truth” to mean something substantially weaker, something more
akin to a strong personal belief that has a solid foundation in data. Although language
is often sufficiently imprecise that there is room for personal interpretation, we simply
do not accept this weakened definitional form of “establish the truth.” Nor do we
believe that this definition fits with a common understanding of the phrase. For
example, we suspect that if an examiner claims that data have “established” that suchand-such is true, jurors will not interpret this to mean merely that the examiner has a
strong belief in the proposition and has some data to back up this belief. Instead, jurors
are likely to equate the examiner’s establishment claim with the indefensible claim
that the data have established the claim to a certainty. In other words, there is no
practical difference between a claim that data have established the truth of a
uniqueness point prediction, and a claim that data have established that truth to an
absolute certainty. And this is why we say that, linguistic preferences aside, there is no
meaningful difference between our position and Professor Kaye’s on the issue of
whether data can truly establish uniqueness: we all agree that they cannot.
36
Kaye, supra note 5, at 1170-71.
37
Professor Kaye objects to this characterization of his position for reasons
similar to those described supra note 35. He thinks that sampling “can demonstrate
uniqueness (in principle, in some populations) especially when considered together
with an understanding of the sources of randomness.” Email from David Kaye to Jay
Koehler & Michael Saks (Feb. 21, 2010, 15:16) (on file with authors) (emphasis added).
Once again, we confront a linguistic problem where we and Professor Kaye are not
using common words and phrases (like “demonstrate uniqueness”) in the same way.
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the focus should be on “whether criminalists are warranted in
believing” that fingerprints are unique.38
We agree that the uniqueness question must turn on the
issue of what the science supports, but it is not clear that we
and Professor Kaye draw the same inferences from that
science. In our view, the existing and foreseeable scientific
knowledge falls far short of providing criminalists with enough
scientific support to claim that the objects that they study are
either unique or discernibly unique. Certainly the uniqueness
question cannot turn on the beliefs that forensic scientists have
about this issue based on their training and experience.
Throughout most of the twentieth century, criminalists
may have felt that they had good justification for believing
many things that subsequent scientific study revealed to be
untrue. For example, at one time criminalists believed that
they were impervious to context effects, or that bullets with
similar trace element profiles necessarily had been
manufactured in the same lead melt. But subsequent scientific
study indicated that those beliefs were either untrue39 or
premature.40 People hold sincere but mistaken and unsupported
beliefs all the time and, in many cases, the negative
consequences are minimal. But when representatives of an
assertedly scientific discipline allow assumption and good faith
belief to substitute for good grounds41 and scientific knowledge,42
the practical effects can hamper the advancement of the
science as well as the search for justice in particular cases.
When forensic scientists testify under oath that markings are
unique, they rarely qualify that testimony by conceding that
the claim reflects more of a personal belief than a scientific
fact.43 The practical reality is that most forensic scientists
38

Kaye, supra note 5, at 1172.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD
EVIDENCE 96-99 (2005); Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts
Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 77 (2006)
(“[I]t is possible to alter identification decisions on the same fingerprint, solely by
presenting it in a different context.”).
40
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BALLISTIC IMAGING 3 (2008) (Daniel L. Cork et
al. eds. 2008) (“The validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and
reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated.”).
41
“Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e.,
‘good grounds’ . . . .” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
42
“‘[S]cientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science.
Similarly, the word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation.” Id.
43
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
39
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bolster the perceived probative value of their individualization
testimony at trial by asserting that evidentiary markings are
unique, and that forensic scientists can individualize by
discerning that uniqueness.44 This is bad science, bad policy,
and should not be welcome on grounds that the testifying
expert is merely expressing a sincere belief.
C.

Individualization

Professor Kaye takes exception to our skepticism about
whether individualization claims can be proved. In Fallacy, we
argued that individualization—the process of linking an
unknown marking to a source, to the exclusion of all other
possible sources45—is “unproved and perhaps unprovable.”46
Professor Kaye disagrees. But much of significance can be said
about our disagreement, starting with what he means by the
term “individualization,” which departs from the conventional
meaning in important ways.
1. Definitions
As we and forensic scientists themselves use the term,
individualization refers to a finding that a particular print or
marking was produced by a particular source, to the exclusion
of all other possible sources on the planet. Importantly,
individualization is not merely a conclusion that a particular
source might be the source of a target marking, that many
other possible sources can be ruled out as the source, or that
there is only a slim chance that any source other than the
named one would share the observed characteristics of the
unknown marking. Individualization is a claim that all
potential sources but one have been affirmatively ruled out as
the person or object that produced the print or marking in

44

SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS (“SWGFAST”),
2009 Standards for Minimum Qualifications and Training to Competency for Friction
Ridge Examiner Trainees (fingerprint examiner training document stating that
examiners must “[u]nderstand the basic foundations for friction ridge examination
(persistence and uniqueness) as a means of identifying the source of an impression”);
see also NRC Report, supra note 4, at 43 (forensic scientists “believe that unique
markings are acquired by a source item in random fashion and that such uniqueness is
faithfully transmitted from the source item to the evidence item being examined”).
45
See The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification, 4
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 30:19.
46
Fallacy, supra note 1, at 208.
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question. That is the definition of individualization most widely
understood within the forensic sciences.47
In the conventional practice of fingerprint examiners, a
different term, “identification,” is considered a proper way to
express a conclusion of “individualization.”48 As Thornton and
Peterson explain:
[I]n everyday usage, the term identification often is used when the
concept of individualization is intended. One may hear testimony of
the sort, “I identified the latent fingerprint as having been made
from the right ring finger of the defendant.” The intent of the
witness here is to declare clearly that the latent fingerprint was that
of the defendant, to the total exclusion of all other fingers of all of
the other people in the world. The use of the term “identified” here is
not the most precise usage of the word; the term “individualized”
would be more felicitous. But use of the term “individualization” and
various other forms of the word would only confuse matters. If, in
response to the question, “Did you have occasion to identify the
suspect’s fingerprint on the knife?” the witness were to answer, “No,
I individualized it,” communication would be thwarted and the
listener confused.49

Although
most
examiners
use
the
terms
individualization
and
identification
interchangeably—a
practice that is sometimes promoted by forensic science
working groups50—some fingerprint examiners have recently
suggested a novel distinction between individualization and
47

“The individualisation of an impression is established by finding
agreement of corresponding individual characteristics of such number and significance
as to preclude the possibility (or probability) of their having occurred by mere
coincidence, and establishing that there are no differences that cannot be accounted
for.” FORENSIC HUMAN IDENTIFICATION: AN INTRODUCTION 74 (Tim Thompson & Sue
M. Black eds., 2007) (quoting HAROLD TUTHILL, INDIVIDUALIZATION: PRINCIPLES AND
PROCEDURES IN CRIMINALISTICS (1994)); see also 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE,
supra note 3, § 30:19; NRC Report, supra note 4, at 43-44; Keith Inman & Norah
Rudin, The Origin of Evidence, in 126 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 11, 11-16 (2002).
48
See SWGFAST, Quality Assurance Guidelines for Latent Print Examiners
(ver. 3.0, 2006) available at http://www.swgfast.org/Quality_Assurance_Guidelines_for_
Latent_Print_Examiners_3.0.pdf (referring to “individualization” throughout);
Christophe Champod, The Inference of Identity of Source: Theory and Practice, Address
at the First International Conference on Forensic Human Identification in The
Millennium, at 1 (Oct. 1999), available at http://www.latent-prints.com/images/
The%20Inference%20and%20Identity%20of%20Source.pdf
(“Among
identification
fields, the term identification generally denotes individualization”). However,
identification is also used by forensic scientists to refer to the process of determining
the category to which an object belongs. This is the nature of the answer to the
question, “what chemical substance is this white powder?” See, e.g., 4 MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 30:19; NRC Report, supra note 4, at 36; Inman &
Rudin, supra note 47.
49
4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 30:19.
50
See SWGFAST, supra note 48.
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identification. This latest redefinition is significant for our
purposes here because it may help explain how Professor Kaye
arrives at his own definition of individualization.
In a recent Minnesota case, two forensic scientists
testified that individualization claims cannot be proven: “The
only way you could prove that is to look at every single person
on the planet. It’s not physically possible and even if you could
do that, that doesn’t mean someone tomorrow won’t be born
with the same friction ridge skin.”51 One of these examiners
went on to draw a distinction between an individualization and
an identification. According to this examiner, “identification”
means that the examiner
made a decision that the chance that someone else could have left
[the print] is so remotely small, he’s willing to dismiss it and say yes,
I believe that this latent print in my opinion was produced by that
individual. He did not say that he’s excluded everyone else on the
planet and he left a theoretical possibility that there might be
someone else on the planet that could have produced a similar
looking latent print. And he has no way of calculating what that
probably is at this time.52

One explanation for this novel attempt to distinguish
between an individualization and an identification might be
that it is an attempt to have one’s cake and eat it too.
Examiners can, on the one hand, acknowledge the scientific
impossibility of “individualizing” while at the same time
preserve the ability to pinpoint a suspected source by asserting
an “identification” and standing it on a more humble
foundation of personal opinion.53
Professor Kaye defines individualization much as
examiner Langenburg seeks to define the weaker term
identification: as “the conclusion that ‘this trace came from this

51

Transcript of Record at 148, State v. Hull, 2008 WL 4301902 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 28, 2008) (CR-07-2336) (cross-examination of Glenn Langenburg). A second
forensic scientist testifying in this same hearing testified that, “the only way to really
say an individualization could occur, is to actually do comparisons to all prints of
everyone that has ever lived.” Id. at 48-49 (direct examination of Joshua Bergeron); see
also Christophe Champod, Identification and Individualization 1 (Nov. 6, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (concluding that “individualization conclusions are out of
reach and cannot be easily substantiated, either in the classic identification fields (such
as fingerprint evidence) or in DNA profiling”).
52
Transcript of Record at 149, Hull, 2008 WL 4301902 (CR-07-2336).
53
Champod & Evett, supra note 3, at 103 (demonstrating that “the
inferential process of identification . . . is essentially inductive and hence
probabilistic”).
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individual or this object.’”54 But individualizations are more
than subjective source conclusions or a witness’s personal
feelings or hunches. They are bold statements about the world
that require proof that cannot now (and probably never will be)
obtained. The definition that Professor Kaye relies on reduces
individualization to a subjective belief that is bolstered by
evidence that falls far short of sufficient proof for this extreme
claim. The difference between individualization as it is
commonly understood and the definition offered by Professor
Kaye is the difference between claiming that Alberto is the
tallest man in the world because his measured height is
greater than every other person in the world, and claiming that
Alberto is the tallest man in the world either because an
insufficiently tested theory assumes he is or because we have
not seen anyone taller among those we have looked at.
2. Small Population Examples
Professor Kaye posits that “there are circumstances in
which an analyst reasonably can testify to having determined
the source of an object.”55 He offers two such circumstances. In
one, he describes an unusual situation where a fingerprint
examiner likely would be justified in claiming that he
individualized a latent print. The situation concerned a crime
that was known with certainty to have occurred at sea and a
latent print that was known with certainty to belong to one of a
relatively small number of passengers, all of whom are
available for testing. We agree that there are some
circumstances in which the potential source population56 of a
print or marking may be narrowed to a small, accessible set.
Indeed, such examples are not unfamiliar in discussions of
individualization.57 However, these examples provide more
54

Kaye, supra note 5, at 1166.
Id.
56
The potential source population is “the group of people who might
reasonably be the source of the recovered trace evidence.” Jonathan J. Koehler, DNA
Matches and Statistics: Important Questions, Surprising Answers, 76 JUDICATURE 222,
227 (1993).
57
One of the authors has used it himself. See Michael J. Saks, Explaining the
Tension Between the Supreme Court’s Embrace of Validity as the Touchstone of
Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Lower Courts’ Rejection of Same, 5 EPISTEME
329, 342 n.1 (2008) (“There is at least one circumstance where certainty of
individualization could be achieved: If the candidates for the perpetration of a crime
could be narrowed to a finite group, and each member of the group had distinguishable
markings (be they fingerprints or something else), and it was known that the
55
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support for the argument that individualization claims are
generally unwarranted than they do for the argument that
individualization should be broadly encouraged. Small, closed
population examples “work” only because one can compare
target latent prints to every member of the potential source
population. The presence of this unusual circumstance is what
sets the stage for an individualization claim (provided, of
course, that all but one print can be eliminated as potential
sources of the target latent).
But what about the more typical situation where the
potential source population cannot be narrowed much beyond
the general population or some other large population? In these
cases, examiners are not able to eliminate every member of the
potential source population, and therefore they are not about to
identify a source using the logical rigor that arises in the small,
closed population example. With this in mind, the relevance of
the ship hypothetical that Professor Kaye offered is not to say
“if individualization can be achieved in this context it can be
achieved in others.” Instead, these types of hypotheticals
remind us that the defensible approach of comparing a
questioned print or marking to all prints or markings in the
potential source population is often not possible. And when
forensic examiners can do no better than sample from larger
potential source populations and draw inferences from their
findings, then they must forsake absolutes. In its place,
forensic scientists should do what other scientists do: offer
suitably cautious conclusions that make use of the tools of
probability and statistics.58
3. Small Random Match Probabilities and the
Inferential Leap
Professor Kaye argues that a second circumstance in
which claims of unequivocal source and individualization
claims are justified occurs when random match probabilities

perpetrator left his markings on the body (or on whatever), then the person who
matched the crime scene markings would have to be the perpetrator.”).
58
See Champod & Evett, supra note 3. We should also note that a new breed
of sophisticated forensic scientists working in the fingerprint area is developing models
and procedures aimed at providing transparent, empirically based, probabilistic
conclusions to replace individualization claims. Glenn Langenburg & Cedric Neumann,
Moving Towards Using Statistics for Fingerprint Evidence in the Courtroom,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF FORENSIC SCIENCES, Seattle, WA,
February 26, 2010.
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are very small.59 In a nutshell, his argument is that object
uniqueness and individualization are, for all intents and
purposes, proved even when there remains a chance that some
objects are not unique or that an individualized marking was
actually produced by some unexamined object. Science, he says,
does not require absolute certainty.60 Instead, we draw
reasonable inferences from the data we have and proceed as if
that inference were absolutely true.
Professor Kaye offers, as an example, the treatment of
Ohm’s law: “Ohm’s law might not be exactly right, or it might
break down tomorrow, but electrical engineers can safely
assume that it is absolutely true.”61 The implication is that even
if forensic examiners can’t be 100% sure of their ability to
individualize, they are safe in proceeding on the assumption
that their individualization conclusions are absolutely true.
An easy response is that Ohm’s law not only “might not
be exactly right,” but it actually is demonstrably wrong under
so many conditions that electrical engineers are not safe to
assume that it is “absolutely true.”62 The implication of the
conditional nature of Ohm’s law for forensic science
individualization claims is that it would not be safe for courts
to simply regard individualization as absolutely true. But this
is too easy. The example Professor Kaye chose was flawed, but
we trust that there exist better illustrations of the point he
wishes to make.
Our response to those better examples would be that
even the best of them is not an apt analogy to the problem that
forensic individualization presents to courts. First, engineers
59

Kaye, supra note 5, at 1176 (“[A] well founded and extremely tiny randommatch probability indicates that, even if some other pairs of objects do match, the
match at issue is not merely a coincidence; rather, it is a true association to a single
source. In appropriate cases, therefore, it is ethical and scientifically sound for an
expert witness to offer an opinion as to the source of the trace evidence.” (footnote
omitted)). Arguably, that final inferential leap is for the factfinder to make—using
knowledge supplied by the expert—not for the expert to make for the factfinder, with
no basis greater than what the factfinder now has. See Wells, infra note 77 and
accompanying text.
60
Kaye, supra note 5, at 1174.
61
Kaye, supra note 5, at 1168.
62
Ohm’s law—which states (in part) that the current between two points in a
conductor is directly proportional to the potential difference (voltage) across the two
points—“holds only approximately and under limited conditions and not for all
materials.” SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ENCYCLOPEDIA 376 (1999). Although there are
contexts within which electrical engineers may safely treat that the law as true, there
are other contexts where such an assumption would spell disaster. Forensic
individualization assumptions probably operate the same way, except that we know far
less about the conditions under which they do and do not hold.
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and scientists have more intimate knowledge of their theories
and data, and appreciate their limitations. Lawyers, judges,
and jurors are much less likely to understand the limitations of
the claims being made for forensic individualization, and the
limitations of its theory, its data, and its conclusions. Second,
the central claim of forensic individualization science is
qualitatively different from all or virtually all other sciences.
Where other sciences cautiously test hypotheses about
relationships among variables, the forensic individualization
sciences simply offer error-bar-free point predictions without
backing those predictions with anything that approaches
scientific validation.63 At the risk of redundancy, it is important
to be clear about what individualization is and is not. It is not
simply a scientific classification claim in which the object in
question is one of a small number of possible sources for the
questioned marking. Nor is it a claim that the probability that
another object is the source is low or even extremely low. It is a
claim that the probability that an object other than the one
identified by the examiner could be the source of the
questioned marking is exactly zero.64 The examiner justifies his
impossibility thesis by making an unwarranted inferential leap
from the mere observation of similar markings or, at best, an
impression or intuition of a low frequency of such markings.
63

Summarizing a central theme in the NRC Report, one of the co-chairmen of
the report refers to the “paucity of scientific research to confirm the validity and
reliability of forensic disciplines.” See Edwards, supra note 31, at 2.
64
The notion that forensic individualization claims are extreme and
fundamentally unscientific is neither a radical idea nor one that is original with us.
Consider, for example, the following passage from a 1998 book by the highly respected
forensic statistician Ian Evett and equally respected biostatistician Bruce Weir about
the meaning of a fingerprint “identification”:
We should be in no doubt about the degree of certainty implicit in a
fingerprint identification. The expert is, in effect, saying “I am certain that
this latent mark and this control print were made by the same person and no
amount of contrary evidence will shake my certainty”. Or, to look at this from
a Bayesian perspective, no matter how small the prior odds are, the
likelihood ratio is so large that the posterior odds approach infinity. Stoney
sees that a fingerprint identification is based on a “leap of faith,” and he is
quite correct to conclude that such a leap of faith has nothing to do with
scientific principles. It is that leap of faith that characterizes the essence of a
conclusion of identity of source and, as he points out, that is a fundamental
difference between fingerprint evidence and DNA evidence. Stoney’s “leap of
faith” is equivalent to attaining an infinite likelihood ratio; this kind of belief
cannot derive from any scientific process.
IAN W. EVETT & BRUCE S. WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL GENETICS
FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 240-41 (1998). Though Evett and Weir use the phrase
“identification” rather than “individualization,” their perspective coincides perfectly
with our own.
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One must remain mindful of where these shortcuts—
these inferential leaps from probably to absolutely—typically
occur. They do not take place primarily in classrooms,
workplaces,
or
in
conversations
among
mutually
knowledgeable experts. They typically occur as expert
testimony in courtrooms, where novice decisionmakers are
charged with, among other things, weighing the value of that
testimony. But the courtroom is a poor environment for
elevating presumed probabilistic truths pertaining to forensic
science evidence to scientific truths.
4. Policy
Even if forensic science individualization claims were
supported by rigorous scientific testing, and even if Professor
Kaye’s view that very low random match probabilities (if and
when they were determined to exist in the various forensic
sciences) were accepted as providing sufficient support for
claims of individualization, good policy reasons counsel against
permitting individualization testimony in criminal litigation.
First, in light of the long history of untested techniques,
insufficient research, testimonial exaggerations, and fabricated
findings in the forensic sciences,65 we should be hesitant about
further elevating and legitimating unproven forensic science
claims.
Second, given the adversarial nature of legal
proceedings, the elevation of presumed truths or linguistic
shortcuts66 to scientific ones unfairly privileges the offering
party (which is usually the government).
Third, a seemingly harmless inferential leap from a very
low probability to zero probability in the context of a criminal
trial might have unintended consequences. One consequence is
the suppression of uncertainty.67 When forensic scientists offer
65

See generally NRC Report, supra note 4.
Professor Kaye writes that “scientists have indicated that opinions of
general uniqueness or uniqueness of a particular DNA type within some smaller region
are or will soon become scientifically acceptable.” Kaye, supra note 5, at 1186 (footnotes
omitted). If true, this phenomenon is being driven more by the exigencies of litigation
than by the results of scientific research. As others have noted, this is less of a
“scientific breakthrough,” as the idea was characterized when first announced, and
more of a “semantic breakthrough.” William C. Thompson & Simon A. Cole,
Psychological Aspects of Forensic Identification Evidence, in EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS 31, 45 (Mark Costanzo, Daniel Krauss & Kathy Pezdek
eds., 2007).
67
Cole, supra note 14, at 30.
66
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an individualization conclusion, they signal to a factfinder that
there is little point in weighing any evidence that militates
against the expert’s conclusion. This could lead to serious
errors by the factfinder.
The inordinate power of expert assertions is illustrated
by a case in which a victim knew a suspect well and excluded
him from a photo identification: she was sure he was not the
man who raped her. Later, she was told that supposedly
irrefutable scientific evidence pinpointed the man as her
attacker. Induced to disbelieve her own personal knowledge,
and given another opportunity to identify the suspect as being
the rapist, she did so. At trial, the victim’s eyewitness
identification was more dramatic and compelling than the
“scientific” evidence, though it was a byproduct of the
“scientific” evidence.68 The suspect, William O’Dell Harris, was
convicted and sent to prison. Years later, it was learned that
the “scientific” evidence had been fabricated.69 When the
biological evidence was subjected to DNA testing, Harris was
excluded as the rapist. After eight years in prison he was
exonerated and released.70 If fabricated scientific evidence can
cause a witness to disbelieve her own personal knowledge and
accept a complete falsehood as true, surely factfinders are also
susceptible to believing exaggerated testimony to the point of
assuming that there is little uncertainty left to resolve in a
case.
Fourth, research suggests that statements made by
experts are given considerable deference by jurors and their
impact is unlikely to be undone either through crossexamination or rebuttal witnesses.71
Fifth, when experts exaggerate the state of their science
and their exaggerations find acceptance in the courtroom,
68

See Jim Dwyer, Peter Neufeld & Barry Scheck, Actual Innocence 114-16
(2000) (describing the case).
69
This was just one of myriad cases that the forensic scientist in the case,
Fred Zain, was eventually found to have fabricated. Zain’s fabrications led the West
Virginia Supreme Court to declare that, “as a matter of law, any testimonial or
documentary evidence offered by Zain at any time in any criminal prosecution should
be deemed invalid, unreliable, and inadmissible.” In re Investigation of the W. Va.
State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 506 (W. Va. 1993) (adopting the
findings of the Report of a special inquiry ordered by the Court).
70
The Innocence Project, Know the Cases, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
know/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
71
Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17, 41 (1996); see also Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the
Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 913 (2003).
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researchers have less incentive for conducting the basic and
applied research needed to put these assertions to the test.72
Thus, research on the frequency with which various
characteristics occur and on the best ways to convey forensic
science evidence may not even get off the ground.
Even if we reach a state where rigorous scientific
support for individualization is available, there are many
practical and policy reasons for not permitting the traditional
forensic sciences to make the individualization leap.
IV.

INDIVIDUALIZATION TESTIMONY: NOT HELPFUL

The 2009 National Research Council report on the
forensic sciences called for more transparency and less
exaggeration: “Forensic reports, and any courtroom testimony
stemming from them, must include clear characterizations of
the limitations of the analyses, including measures of
uncertainty in reported results and associated estimated
probabilities where possible.”73 Fallacy offered a similar call. It
argued that scientific foundations need to be improved, the
application of those foundations to case-specific findings needs
to be improved, and examiners’ personal views about the
evidence need to be kept out of reports and testimony.
Given (a) the current lack of scientific support for claims
related to individualization in the traditional forensic sciences,
and (b) the likelihood that jurors will not meaningfully
differentiate an examiner’s individualization opinions from a
statement of scientific fact about individualization,74 we suggest
that forensic examiners should be barred from offering
individualization opinions. Individualization opinions violate
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires that scientific
opinion testimony, to be admissible, must “assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”
72

Cole, supra note 14, at 31-32 (discussing the “perverse incentives created
by the current weak legal regime that permits extremely strong claims like
‘individualization’ without empirical support”). Professor Kaye appreciates this point as
well. He notes that “a strong argument can be made” for excluding comments by an
examiner related to why he thinks a match is probative of identity “to encourage more
extensive research.” Kaye, supra note 5, at 1185 n.86.
73
NRC Report, supra note 4, at 21-22; see also id. at 185.
74
Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic
Identification Science: What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 436 (2009); Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks,
Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and
Impact, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1169 (2008).
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and must be “based upon sufficient facts or data.”75 Opinions
about whether a marking has been individualized to its one
and only possible source ordinarily are not based upon
sufficient facts or data. Nor do they provide assistance to the
trier of fact beyond that which can be gained from a less
grandiose presentation of the forensic science findings, and a
more candid presentation of their limitations. Instead,
individualization testimony has considerable potential to
mislead factfinders rather than to assist them. Though Federal
Rule of Evidence 704 expressly permits the offer of an ultimate
opinion (such as here, on identity), testimony admitted under
Rule 704 still must pass the helpfulness requirements of Rule
702 and be based on adequate data to support the opinion.76 A
forensic scientist’s opinion about source identification or
individualization provides no more value to factfinders than
what could be provided by more data-based statements, while
having more potential to mislead.77
In conclusion, forensic scientists should not be
permitted to capitalize on the lack of supportive scientific data
about either characteristic frequency or their own diagnostic
reliability by going beyond what is known and what can be
stated on good grounds. They should not be permitted to say, in
effect, “trust me: that’s the source.” Real scientists don’t say
“trust me.” They provide data.

75

FED. R. EVID. 702.
“The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to
admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of
fact . . . .” FED. R. EVID 704 advisory committee’s note.
77
Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective
Probability Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739, 747 (1992) (finding, in
Experiment 4, that both judges and jurors were far more likely to find liability when
provided with expert testimony consisting of the relevant data plus the expert’s
personal opinion that the defendant was the source, than when they were presented
with all the same information but not the expert’s conclusory opinion).
76

